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21. Introduction
In all social or economic interactions, the beliefs of the actors contribute to shape the set
of outcomes. In game-theoretical models, the richness of outcomes is captured by the set of
rationalizable strategy profiles. The global game literature (e.g. Carlsson and van Damme
(1993), Frankel et al. (2003), and Morris and Shin (2003)) suggests a perturbation of com-
plete information that delivers a unique rationalizable equilibrium. This perturbation gives
players’ beliefs the right properties to obtain uniqueness. What are these properties? How
do they act with the payoffs to determine the rationalizable outcome? The standard global
game method does not cover games with heterogeneous beliefs (non-common prior type
spaces), games with general information structures, games played by non-Bayesian play-
ers, and Bayesian mechanism design. In these cases, our understanding of rationalizability
requires an answer to the above questions.
In this paper, we study some properties of type spaces that explain the size and the
location of the set of rationalizable strategy profiles, where rationalizability corresponds to
the definition of interim correlated rationalizability in Dekel et al. (2007). These properties
are characteristics of players’ beliefs that do not require to specify the origin of the beliefs.
They are compatible with general belief formation and apply to all the aforementioned cases.
This paper deals with games with incomplete information and complementarities. A
flexible framework for modeling beliefs is that of type spaces. Players have a payoff type,
called the state of nature, and an informational type. The state of nature may represent
the physical reality, such as the weakness of a currency. Conditional on his informational
type, a player formulates beliefs about the state of nature and about others’ (informational)
types. Players are assumed to care exclusively about an aggregate of others’ actions, such as
their average action. The games under consideration have strategic complementarities and
dominance regions, that is, “tail regions” of the state space for which the extremal actions
are strictly dominant. The model incorporates many classic problems such as investment
games, currency crisis, search models, etc.
The first characteristic that we study is the type-sensitivity of players’ beliefs. The notion
has two dimensions, one for the beliefs about the state and one for the beliefs about others’
3types. The first dimension answers the question: when the player’s type increases, by how
much does he think the state will increase on average? This is related to how informative
the player thinks his type is. A large answer denotes high sensitivity. The second dimension
applies to the beliefs about others’ types and it is determined by the question: when a
player’s type increases, does he think others’ types will increase more or less than his type
and by how much? Since the games under study are aggregative, we will actually ask the more
operational yet equivalent question: assuming that other players decrease their strategies, by
how much does a player think the aggregate will decrease on average if his type increases?
The answer is the second dimension of type-sensitivity. The player is asked to consider
counterfactual information: his opponents decrease their strategies but simultaneously his
type increases.
The second characteristic that we study is the optimism of players’ beliefs. This charac-
teristic also has two dimensions and it aims to measure how favorable a player expects the
outcome to be. By convention, an outcome is more favorable if it is larger, which happens
when the aggregate and the state are larger. A player becomes more optimistic if, for each
informational type, he now believes larger states and larger aggregates are more likely.
Let us discuss our contribution in more details. Recall that, in games with complementar-
ities, there exist a largest and a smallest equilibrium and the distance between them gives
the size of the set of rationalizable strategy profiles (Milgrom and Roberts (1990)).
Our first result provides an explicit upper bound on the size of the set of rationalizable
strategy profiles. The second result provides an explicit lower bound on the movement of
the rationalizable set after a change of optimism. Both bounds condense type-sensitivity,
optimism, and the characteristics of the payoffs in expressions that determine the size and the
(change of) location of the rationalizable strategies. These expressions are easy to compute
in comparison to applying iterative dominance and computing the rationalizable outcomes
directly. Examples will illustrate this practical advantage.
Our main contribution is to provide the tools to study rationalizability in general environ-
ments. The global game method suggests a specific perturbation of complete information
that delivers a unique rationalizable equilibrium: a payoff parameter — that was common
4knowledge — is drawn from a common prior and players receive a noisy additive signal of
its realization. As the noise vanishes, a unique Bayesian equilibrium survives. Many scenar-
ios do not fit the global game description: games with heterogeneous beliefs (non-common
prior type spaces), games with general (non-additive) signal structures, games played by
non-Bayesian players, and Bayesian mechanism design. To study these cases, it is important
to understand the properties of type spaces inherited from the global game perturbation and
how they interact with the payoffs to form the rationalizable strategies. Type-sensitivity and
optimism are such properties and they exist regardless of the specification that produces the
posterior beliefs — with or without a common prior, additive signals, Bayesian updating,
etc. This has several important implications described next.
Our results imply new uniqueness results and promote a better understanding of existing
ones. The upper bound provided by the first result subsumes the global game uniqueness
result. The bound shows that if type-sensitivity is high compared to the strategic comple-
mentarities, then there is a unique equilibrium. In global games, type-sensitivity becomes
high as the noise vanishes, because the type becomes a perfect predictor of the state and of
other’s types. The expression of the bound shows explicitly that the global game information
structure dampens the complementarities to the point where a unique equilibrium survives.
This generalizes and formalizes arguments presented by Vives (2004) and Mathevet (2007).
But equilibrium uniqueness holds much more generally than in standard global games. We
illustrate this fact in Section 2 with a simple investment game where uniqueness obtains in
a non-common prior type space and in an asymmetric signaling function specification.
Our results allow a general analysis of equilibrium multiplicity. While the literature has
focused on uniqueness, it is important to understand and quantify equilibrium multiplicity.
In supermodular mechanism design, for example, knowing the size of the equilibrium set
allows to compute the welfare loss that may be caused by bounded rationality (Mathevet
(2010)). Our results show that a larger type-sensitivity is conducive to tighter equilibrium
sets. Moreover, certain characteristics of equilibrium multiplicity are interesting. For ex-
ample, which players decide to dramatically change their equilibrium strategy in response
to changes in the equilibrium strategies of others? This type of questions evoke a form of
5influence in games. In Section 6.3, we claim that players with higher type-sensitivity are
more influential than others in the sense that they “stick” to their strategies across equilibria
instead of dramatically changing them.
Finally, our results give rise to new applications. An economist may be interested in
studying a phenomenon, a currency crisis or a bank run, with players having different priors
(Varian (1986)), asymmetric non-additive signals, or updating biases. In Section 6.1, we
apply our results to Bayesian mechanism design. Mathevet (2010) introduces supermodular
mechanism design. The main idea is to design direct mechanisms that are robust to certain
forms of bounded rationality. The author suggests to design mechanisms that induce super-
modular games but he warns that excessive complementarities may produce new equilibria
and disrupt learning.1 This justifies his construction of the optimal (or minimal) supermod-
ular mechanism, one that gives the smallest equilibrium set in the class of supermodular
mechanisms. But what is the size of the smallest equilibrium set? In certain applications, as
in Section 6.1, our first result provides an answer and helps the designer in his choice of the
mechanism parameters. In Section 6.2, we deal with games played by non-Bayesian players.
Consider a standard global game setting but assume that players literally make updating
mistakes. The results clarify the strategic implications of certain updating biases.
The importance of understanding rationalizability beyond global games is emphasized by
Morris and Shin (2009). They characterize the hierarchies of beliefs that imply dominance-
solvability in binary-action games with incomplete information. Our paper formulates al-
ternative but related conditions in games with finitely many actions. We will discuss the
relationship of type-sensitivity to the notion of decreasing rank beliefs suggested by Morris
and Shin (2009). Izmalkov and Yildiz (2010) is another paper close to ours. The authors
introduce sentiments into the study of global games. They define notions of optimism and
analyze partnerships and currency crises. Our second result is a generalization of their re-
sults in the partnership game. Other papers, e.g. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) and Oyama
and Tercieux (2011), study rationalizability in general environments but their objective is
1This is because Mathevet (2010) studies weak implementation and truthtelling is the only equilibrium
known to be desirable.
6different from ours. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that for any rationalizable action of
any type, the beliefs of the type can be perturbed in a way that this action is uniquely
rationalizable for the new type. As a result, the beliefs may satisfy the conditions for
dominance-solvability — high type-sensitivity for example — yet the unique equilibrium
may vary with other properties of the beliefs — optimism for example.2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a motivating
example. Section 3 presents the model and the assumptions. Sections 4 and 5 contain the
main definitions and results. In Section 6, we provide two applications. The last section
concludes.
2. An Investment Game
Consider a standard investment game. Two players are deciding whether to invest. The
net profits are given by the following matrix where θ ∈ R is the fundamental of the economy:
1 0
1 θ, θ θ − 1, 0
0 0, θ − 1 0, 0
We want to model the effect of strategic uncertainty on investment decisions. The state θ
is drawn randomly and players receive a signal ti of its realization. Several versions of that
scenario are possible:
(i) Standard global games. State θ is drawn from a common prior. Each investor receives
a signal ti = θ + νi where ν > 0 and i is a random variable. The analyst studies the case
ν → 0 where signals become infinitely precise.
(ii) Non-common priors. Each player i formulates beliefs about θ and tj given his signal.








beliefs do not come from a common prior type space: each player i believes that j’s signal is
a perfect predictor of the state, while each j believes his own signal to be an imperfect signal
2Thus the analyst may know that there is a unique equilibrium but without further knowledge of players’
beliefs, such as their optimism level, she may be unable to pin it down, which is a form of multiplicity.
7of the state. An alternative way of obtaining heterogeneous beliefs, proposed by Izmalkov
and Yildiz (2010), is to start with the global game formulation but assume that each player
has his own subjective beliefs about (1, 2).
(iii) Subjective signaling functions. Suppose θ is drawn from a uniform prior, but the
signaling functions are subjective. Each player i uses tii = α
i




iθ + ν with
αii < α
j
i when formulating his posterior beliefs. This information structure models players
who think that their signals do not carry fundamental shocks like their opponent’s signal.
That is, players think that they obtain their private information from a different channel
than their opponent. When i’s signal increases, i believes j’s signal will increase more. This
scenario also produces heterogeneous beliefs.
(iv) Non-vanishing noise. Consider the standard global game setup with ti = θ + νi but
let νi be fixed, strictly positive, and different across players (see Section 6.3).
(v) Non-Bayesian Updating. Consider the standard global game setup with non-Bayesian
players. Players have updating biases. For example, players overreact and amplifies the
information contained in their signal (see Section 6.2).
The beliefs generated by scenarios (ii) and (iii) cannot be the product of a global game
formulation. Likewise, the analysis of scenarios (iv) and (v) requires new concepts.
Our main concept is type-sensitivity. This concept has two dimensions. Let Ti = R be
player i’s type set. The first dimension is the answer to the question: if i’s type increases
by v > 0, by how much does i think the state will increase on average? In the above non-
common prior example, the answer would simply be 4v/5. The second dimension applies to
i’s beliefs about tj. We want to know how much i thinks j’s type increases after ti increases.
Suppose an event E occurs if {tj > sj} and i’s type is ti, or it occurs if {tj > sj + v} and
i’s type is ti + v. In which case does i believe E is more likely? If i believes that j’s type
increases at least as much as his, a case referred to as highly type-sensitive beliefs, then
the event is more likely in the second case. Thus, beliefs are highly type-sensitive in our
non-common prior and subjective signals examples. In the global game specification, E is
8more likely in the first case but the difference in the probabilities of the event in the two
cases vanishes as ν → 0.
If beliefs are highly type-sensitive, then there is a unique equilibrium. Let µi(θ|ti) be the
cdf representing the beliefs about θ given ti. In this game, a strategy for i is characterized
by a cutoff si. Player i invests if and only if his type is above si, where si is the type at
which i is indifferent between investing and not investing:∫
θ∈R
(θ − 1 + Prob(tj > sj|θ, si))dµi(θ|si) = 0. (2.1)
By way of contradiction, suppose there exist two symmetric equilibria, characterized by
cutoffs s and s (s < s), whose interval in between contains all rationalizable strategy profiles.
High type-sensitivity says that i expects j to invest at least as often under strategy s given
ti = s as what i expects under strategy s given ti = s. Note that a larger type leads i to
expect a larger state: when ti = s, i believes the state is larger by at least σ
i
1 > 0 than when
ti = s.
3 Therefore, high type-sensitivity means Prob(tj > s|θ + σi1, s) ≥ Prob(tj > s|θ, s). If
(2.1) holds at (s1, s2) = (s, s) — which is the case by definition of an equilibrium — then∫
θ∈R
(θ + σi1 − 1 + Prob(tj > s|θ + σ1, s))dµi(θ|s) > 0. (2.2)
The lhs of (2.2) is weakly smaller than the lhs of (2.1) evaluated at (s1, s2) = (s, s). Thus
(2.1) does not hold for (s1, s2) = (s, s), which contradicts the optimality of s.
3. The Model
We study games with incomplete information. The set and the number of players are
N <∞.4 Player i’s action set is a finite and linearly ordered set Ai = {ai,1, . . . , ai,Mi} where
actions are indexed in increasing order. Let A−i =
∏
i 6=iAj be the set of action profiles of
players other than i. Let θ ∈ Θ ≡ R be the state of nature.
3We will call this condition strict first-order stochastic dominance.
4The paper and its results can be extended to N =∞ if players are placed into finitely many groups.
93.1. The Payoffs. Each player i only cares about an aggregate Γi of his opponents’ actions.
This aggregate is an increasing function that maps action profiles and states from A−i × R
onto a linearly ordered set Gi. For example, a player may care about the average of his
opponents’ actions or the proportion of them playing an action.5 Our payoff structure allows
for common values, ui(ai,Γi(a−i, θ), θ), or private values, ui(ai,Γi(a−i), ti), but no mixture
of the two. A player’s utility does not depend on the state and his type.
The Assumptions. Let X and T be two ordered sets. A function f : X × T → R has
increasing differences in (x, t) if for all x′ > x and t′ > t, f(x′, t′)−f(x, t′) ≥ f(x′, t)−f(x, t).
The function has strictly increasing differences if the previous inequality holds strictly. The
assumptions are given in the common value formulation but the same ones — replacing the
state by the type — must hold under private values:
(A1) For each i, ui has increasing differences in (ai, a−i) for each θ.
(A2) For each i, ui has strictly increasing differences in (ai, θ) for each a−i.
(A3) For each a, ui is bounded on all compact sets of θ.
(A4) There exist states θ and θ such that for θ > θ, the largest action is strictly dominant,
and for θ < θ, the smallest action is strictly dominant.
The first assumption introduces strategic complementarities, by which a player wants to
increase his action when others do so as well. The second assumption introduces state
monotonicity, by which a player wants to increase his action when the state is larger. The
third is a technical condition, and the last one imposes dominance regions.
All these assumptions are standard in the global game literature. The currency crisis
model of Morris and Shin (1998), the bank run model of Morris and Shin (2000), and the
model of merger waves of Toxvaerd (2008) are examples where these assumptions hold. We
refer the reader to Morris and Shin (2003) for further examples.
3.2. The Beliefs. The state of nature is randomly drawn. Players are uncertain about
its realization. They receive some private information about the realized state. Then they
formulate beliefs about the state and others’ information. A flexible framework for modeling
5In these cases Γi(a−i, θ) =
∑
j 6=i aj and Γi(a−i, θ) = (
∑
j 6=i 1aj≥a∗(θ))/(N − 1).
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beliefs is that of type spaces. A type space is a collection T = (Ti, µi)i∈N . Let Ti = R for
each i ∈ N and denote T−i =
∏
j 6=i Tj. Let ∆(Z) be the space of probability measures on Z.
Player i’s beliefs are a function
µi : Ti → ∆(Θ× T−i)
where µi(ti) is i’s beliefs about the state and others’ types when his type is ti. For practical
reasons, we decompose µi(ti) into two beliefs: µi(θ|ti) is (the cdf of) the marginal distribution
of θ and µi(·|θ, ti) is the conditional measure on T−i given θ. For any subsets of states and
types, Θˆ and Tˆ−i, µi(ti)[Θˆ × Tˆ−i] =
∫
Θˆ
µi(Tˆ−i|θ, ti)dµi(θ|ti). Under private values, there is
no state of nature, but this is technically equivalent to a common values case where µi(θ|ti)
is derived from the Dirac measure.6
The Assumptions. Let >st stand for the (strict) first-order stochastic dominance ordering.
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Let ≥st be the multidimensional first-order stochastic ordering (Shaked and Shanthikumar
(1994)). We impose the following assumptions on beliefs:
(A1) For each i, if t′i > ti, then µi(·|t′i) >st µi(·|ti).
(A2) For each i, if (t′i, θ
′) ≥ (ti, θ), then µi(·|θ′, t′i) ≥st µi(·|θ, ti).
(A3) For each i, there is Di > 0 such that |ti−θ| > Di implies µi(θ+ |ti)−µi(θ− |ti) = 0
for all  > 0 small enough.
(A4) For each i,
∫
µi({tj > sj}j 6=i|θ, ti)dµi(θ|ti) is continuous in ti and s−i.
The first assumption says that a player believes that larger states are more likely when
his type increases. The second assumption says that a player believes that the other players
are more likely to have larger types when his type and the state increase. According to the
third assumption, the likelihood of states that are excessively far from a player’s type is null.
Under private values, (A1) and (A3) are automatically satisfied.
These assumptions are satisfied by the global game information structure, and therefore,
by most applications of global games (see e.g. Morris and Shin (2003)). There are no further
6The Dirac measure gives measure 1 to every set that contains ti and 0 to others. It implies that all
expected terms of the form
∫
R u(θ)dµi(θ|ti) are simply equal to u(ti) for every function u.






requirement. Belief formation can be rather general. Players may not share the same prior
distribution. Players need not be Bayesian, as they need not be to form posterior beliefs
(see e.g. Epstein (2006)).
3.3. Strategies and Aggregate Distribution. A strategy for player i is a function si :
Ti → Ai. Under our assumptions, only strategies that are monotone in a player’s type will
be relevant. The argument relies on Van Zandt and Vives (2007) and it is developed in
the appendix. Given the finite number of actions, i’s relevant strategies are step functions,
represented by a vector of cutoffs in RMi−1. The games under consideration are aggregative.
Therefore, player i ultimately cares about the probability distribution of the state and of the
aggregate Γi. Conditionally on type ti, state θ, and others’ strategies s−i, i can construct the
probability distribution of the aggregate values. The derivation is relegated to the appendix.
Let gi(γ|τi) where τi = (θ, s−i, ti) be the probability of {Γi = γ}. Let Gi be the corresponding
cdf, i.e. Gi(γ|τi) is the probability of {Γi < γ} given τi.
3.4. Rationalizability. Our solution concept corresponds to interim correlated rationaliz-
ability (Dekel et al. (2007)). Morris and Shin (2009) note that there is no difference between
ex-ante and interim rationalizability in this environment due to the supermodularity as-
sumptions. Best-response dynamics starting from the largest strategy profile converges to
the largest equilibrium in an incomplete information game with supermodular payoffs (Vives
(1990)) and the largest equilibrium correspond to the largest rationalizable strategy profile
(Milgrom and Roberts (1990)).
4. Type-sensitivity and Rationalizability
This section defines type-sensitivity and investigates its role in determining the size of the
set of rationalizable strategy profiles. Since strategies are vectors si = (si,`)
Mi−1
`=1 , we let the
distance between profiles s and s′ be the sup norm d(s, s′) = maxi max` |s′i,` − si,`|.
4.1. Type-sensitivity. The basic ingredients of our definition are the average state and the
average aggregate. Let Γei [Gi(τi)] be the average aggregate value obtained from Gi(τi). Let
µσi (θ|ti) = µi(θ − σ|ti) denote i’s beliefs after a rightward shift by an amount σ ≥ 0.
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Since a player produces marginal beliefs about the state and conditional beliefs about
others’ types, type-sensitivity has two dimensions. Let v > 0.
Definition 1. The type-sensitivity of the marginal beliefs is given by function σi1 where σ
i
1(v)
is the supremum of all σ such that µi(·|ti + v) ≥st µσi (·|ti) for all ti.
This definition describes the minimal shift in player i’s beliefs after an increase in type. If
beliefs µi(·|ti) belong to a location-scale family,8 such as the normal or logistic distribution,
then type-sensitivity is simply the answer to the question: when a player’s type increases by
v, by how much does he think the state will increase on average?
The second dimension of type-sensitivity applies to the conditional beliefs µi(·|θ, ti). The
basic idea is to know whether i thinks that others’ types increase more than his after his own
type increases. Suppose i’s type increases by v. One immediate consequence is that i believes
the state increases by at least σi1(v) on average. Consider the two distributions µi(·|θ, ti) and
µi(·|θ + σi1(v), ti + v). Let us compare the likelihood of the event {tj > sj}j 6=i under the
first distribution (i.e. before ti increases), and the likelihood of the event {tj > sj + v}j 6=i
under the second distribution (i.e. after ti increases). If the event after increase is more
likely, then i believes that others’ types increase at least as much as his. Another way to
proceed, which we adopt, is to ask the similar question: if every j 6= i decreases his strategy,
i.e. j increases each cutoff in his strategy from sj,` to sj,` + v,
9 while ti increases by v, by
how much does i believe the aggregate will decrease on average? This question forces the
player to consider counterfactual information. The first piece of information indicates that
the aggregate should decrease, while the second indicates that it should increase. The next
definition formalizes the answer.
Let c(v) = (σi1(v),v, v) where v is a vector with identical entries v. The vector τi + c(v) =
(θ + σi1(v), s−i + v, ti + v) represents the counterfactual information: i’s opponents each
decrease their strategies while i’s type increases.
8Let f(x) be a pdf. For k ∈ R and η > 0, the family of pdfs (1/η)f((x− k)/η) indexed by (k, η) is called
the location-scale family with standard pdf f . For example, µi(·|ti) could be the cdf of a normal distribution
with mean ti/2 and variance σ2.
9Increasing the cutoffs delays the play of larger actions, and thus, it corresponds to decreasing a strategy.
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Definition 2. The type sensitivity of the conditional beliefs is given by any function σi2 such
that σi2(v) ≥ Γei [Gi(τi) ∨Gi(τi + c(v))]− Γei [Gi(τi + c(v))] for all v and τi.10
Under private values, this is the only definition of type-sensitivity. If the conditional beliefs
are highly type-sensitive, then the player believes that larger aggregates are at least as likely
despite the counterfactual information: Gi(τi + c(v)) ≥st Gi(τi). In this case, if asked by
how much Γi should decrease, the player would answer zero, σ
i
2(v) = 0.
Type-sensitivity is related to the decreasing rank beliefs condition used by Morris and
Shin (2009) to prove dominance solvability in binary-action games. For each k, they define
rank beliefs as the probability that a player assigns to there being k players whose signals are
lower than his signal. The condition requires that as a player’s signal increases he believes
that his rank in the population decreases. They take the example of a student whose test
score increases. If grading is on a curve, is it good news or bad news? Under decreasing rank
beliefs, it is bad news, because the student believes the test was easy, hence others’ scores
must have increased more than his. Therefore, such a player has highly type-sensitive beliefs
and his σi2(v) should be small.
4.2. The First Theorem. Let ∆nmui(γ, θ) = ui(an, γ, θ) − ui(am, γ, θ) be the difference in
utility between actions an and am. Define
C∗i (θ) = max
γ
∆Mi1 ui(S(γ), θ)−∆Mi1 ui(γ, θ)
S(γ)− γ , (4.1)
where S(γ) is the successor of γ11 and for x ≥ 0,
M i∗(x, θ) = min
(γ,n,m)
∆nmui(γ, θ + x)−∆nmui(γ, θ). (4.2)
10∨ stands for the supremum between two distributions w.r.t. first-order stochastic dominance. The
supremum of two cdfs is the pointwise minimum between them. In the main theorem, it will be important
to choose the smallest σi2(v) satisfying the condition.
11S(γ) = min{γ′ ∈ Gi : γ′ > γ} is the value that comes right after γ in Gi. If Ai = {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} for all i
and the aggregate is the sum, then S(γ) = γ + 1.
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The first assumption on payoffs (A1) defines strategic complementarities. Function C∗ mea-
sures the maximal amount of strategic complementarities in the game. The second assump-
tion on payoffs (A2) describes strict increasing differences in action and state. Function M∗
measures the minimal amount of monotonicity between the action and the state. Denote by
M∗(x, ti) and C∗(ti) the expected value of these functions under µi(θ|ti).
The main result features function ε
ε(µ,u) = inf{v > 0 : v > v ⇒M i∗(σi1(v), ti)− σi2(v)C∗i (ti) > 0
for all ti ∈ [θ −Di, θ +Di − v] and all i}. (4.3)
Among all the v’s above which the inequality within (4.3) is always satisfied, ε chooses
the infimum value. The monotonicity properties of ε(·) will be important: (i) if M∗ and σi1
increase uniformly, then ε decreases; (ii) if C∗ and σi2 increase uniformly, then ε increases.
Theorem 1. In the game of incomplete information, the distance between any two profiles
of rationalizable strategies is less than ε(µ,u).
The proof is relegated to the appendix.
The theorem suggests a nice interpretation. A type-sensitive player acts as if he were not
affected much by the complementarities (the term σi2(v)C
∗
i (ti) in function ε). Such a player
merely follows his type, which “disconnects” him from others. Therefore, type-sensitivity
dampens the strategic complementarities and this favors uniqueness. To the contrary, if the
beliefs are not sensitive to one’s type, then they can easily be swayed by others’ strategies.
This gives bite to the complementarities and favors multiplicity.
Two main comparative statics lessons can be learned. The first one is that state mono-
tonicity tends to shrink the set of rationalizable strategy profiles, whereas strategic comple-
mentarities tend to enlarge it. Function ε is, indeed, decreasing in M∗ and increasing in C∗.
The explanation is intuitive. State sensitivity disconnects a player from the others by making
his action very sensitive to his own information, while strategic complementarities connect
players together. Interestingly, strategic complementarities not only favor multiplicity but
may also enlarge the equilibrium set.
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The second lesson is that type-sensitivity tends to shrink the set of rationalizable strategy
profiles. This fact is strong because it holds across belief structures. Say that beliefs µ are
more type-sensitive than µ′ if for all i ∈ N and v, σi1(v) ≥ σ′i1 (v) and σi2(v) ≤ σ′i2 (v).
Corollary 1. If beliefs µ are more type-sensitive than µ′, then ε(µ,u) ≤ ε(µ′,u).
As type-sensitivity becomes very high, the strategic complementarities have no impact.
Thus, high type-sensitivity implies uniqueness. Beliefs µ are highly type-sensitive if σi1(v) > 0
and σi2(v) = 0 for all v and i ∈ N .
Corollary 2. If beliefs are highly type-sensitive, then there is a unique equilibrium.
Proof. If σi2 = 0 and σ
i
1(·) > 0, then ε(µ,u) = 0, because M∗(σi1(v), ti) > 0 for all v > 0. 
4.3. Examples.
4.3.1. Investment Game. Consider the game from Section 2. It is easy to compute C∗i (θ) = 1
and M i∗(x, θ) = x for all i. By Theorem 1, the size of the equilibrium set is bounded by
ε(µ,u) = inf{v > 0 : v > v ⇒ σi1(v)− σi2(v) > 0 for all i}. (4.4)
In a two-player game, the aggregate is the other player’s action. Therefore, Γei [Gi(τi)] =
Prob(Γi = 1|τi) = Prob(tj > sj1|θ, ti). In Section 2, we suggested a non-common prior
and a subjective signaling function scenarios. In both cases, we argued that σi(v) > 0
and σi2(v) = 0 for all v and i, which implies equilibrium uniqueness since ε(µ,u) = 0.
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Consider an alternative specification. Take a global game structure where θ ∼ N(1/2, τ),
ν = 1, and i has a (truncated) normal distribution with mean 0, variance η
2, and support
[−4η, 4η]. Choose τ = .1 and η = .01. The beliefs µi(θ|ti) and µi(tj|θ) are approximately
(truncated) normal distributions: the first has mean 0.99ti+ .005 and the second has mean θ





if sj1 + v ∈
[θ + σi1(v) − 4η, θ + σi1(v) + 4η], (ii) 1 if sj1 + v is below this interval, (iii) 0 otherwise.
Computations give σi1(v) ≈ .99v and σi2(v) = max Γei [Gi(τi + c(v))]− Γei [Gi(τi + c(0))] ≈ .4.
In conclusion, ε(µ,u) ≈ 0.4.
12The non-common prior example satisfies all our assumptions on beliefs. The subjective signaling scenario
requires some conditions on the distribution of  to satisfy these assumptions.
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4.3.2. Global Games. In global games, players have a common prior over θ, ti = θ + νi is
common knowledge, and ν → 0. The main result is uniqueness. As ν → 0, the signal becomes
a perfect predictor hence limν→0 σi1(v) = v and limν→0 σ
i
2(v) = 0 for all v.
13 Corollary 2
implies uniqueness. (4.3) describes how the global game information structure dampens the
complementarities to the point where a unique equilibrium survives. This generalizes and
formalizes arguments presented by Vives (2004) and Mathevet (2007). Moreover, when the
prior is uniform, there is a unique equilibrium for all ν > 0. Since the prior provides no
information, posterior beliefs are highly type-sensitive. Corollary 2 implies uniqueness.
5. Optimism and Rationalizability
This section studies the role of optimism and type-sensitivity in locating the rationalizable
outcomes. In the investment game of Section 2, equilibrium uniqueness does not say whether
the unique equilibrium cutoff s = 1/2 or 3/4 or else. Theorem 1 does not give the value, or
the position, of the rationalizable strategy profiles within the whole set of strategy profiles.
This section addresses the question: when optimism changes, across two groups of players
or two periods, how do the extremal rationalizable strategies change? The answer enables
us to compute the change of likelihood of an event, such as a currency attack or a bank run.
First we define optimism. Then we measure its change across belief structures. Finally,
we present the main result and apply it to the model of Izmalkov and Yildiz (2010).
5.1. Optimism. We compare two sets of players, or the same players at two different dates,
whose beliefs are {µi} and {µ′i}. Let Gi and G′i be the corresponding aggregate distributions.
Player i’s beliefs become more optimistic if µ′i(·|ti) ≥st µi(·|ti) and G′i(·|τi) ≥st Gi(·|τi) for
all τi, i.e. if i believes larger states and larger aggregates are more likely. This definition
generalizes the notion of optimism defined by Izmalkov and Yildiz (2010) (see Section 5.4).
5.2. Measuring Changes in Optimism. Our objective is to measure the shift of the
rationalizable outcomes. This shift depends on the magnitude of the shift in optimism.
13It is not trivial to show this because convergence has to be uniform in type and strategies.
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Definition 3. The change of optimism of the marginal beliefs, denoted ωi1, is the supremum
of all ω such that µ′i(·|ti) ≥st µωi (·|ti) for all ti.14
The change of optimism of the conditional beliefs is measured in a slightly different way.
Take two aggregate distributions G and H. If H is more optimistic than G (i.e. H ≥st G),
then the difference in optimism is the difference in the expectations. If neither H nor G is
more optimistic, then a worst-case analysis is used: if H is not more optimistic than G, then
at least G does not dominate H more than G∨H does. The next definition formalizes these
ideas. Let χ(H,G, τi) be equal to G(τi) if H(τi) ≥st G(τi), and H(τi) ∨G(τi) otherwise.
Definition 4. The change of optimism from aggregate distribution Gi to H is any number
ωi2 ≤ Γei [Hi(τi)]− Γei [χ(H,Gi, τi)] for all τi.15
5.3. The Second Theorem. There is another effect to understand before measuring the
change of the rationalizable outcomes. To illustrate it, suppose players become more opti-
mistic but their optimism is “fragile.” Although they are more optimistic, a slight decrease
in type (say ti − ) leads them to have the same outlook on the state and Γi as under their
original beliefs (at type ti). In this case, it is intuitive that the set of rationalizable outcomes
should not change much. Therefore, the result must account for the change of optimism in
response to a change in type. Let us introduce first another notion of type-sensitivity.
Definition 5. The type-sensitivity of the marginal beliefs is the function ψi1, where ψ
i
1(v) is
the infimum of all ψ such that µi(θ + ψ|ti + v) ≥ µi(θ|ti) for all θ and all ti.
This alternative definition is the amount by which a stochastically dominant distribution
should be shifted to the left to become dominated. This notion is always larger than the
notion from Definition 1. The two notions only give different values when the shape of the
beliefs change after a change in type. For location-scale families, both notions coincide.
Let o(v) = (ψi1(v) − ωi1,0, v) where 0 is a vector of zeroes. A player with an optimistic
view on the state (ωi1) who receives a negative news v, thereby decreasing the state by at
14Recall µωi (θ|ti) = µi(θ − ω|ti) for ω > 0.
15One obvious choice is the largest ωi2 satisfying the inequality.
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most ψi1(v), is represented by vector τi− o(v) = (θ−ψi1(v) +ωi1, s−i, ti− v). The main result
features function δ:
δ(µ, µ′,u) = sup{v : M∗(ωi1 − ψi1(v), ti) + min{ωi2(v)C∗(ti), ωi2(v)C∗(ti)} ≥ 0
for all ti ∈ [θ −Di + v, θ +Di] and all i} (5.1)
where ωi2(v) is the change of optimism from distribution Gi to Hv : τi 7→ G′i(τi − o(v)), and
C∗ measures the minimal amount of strategic complementarities.16 Among all the v’s that
satisfy the inequality in (5.1), δ picks the supremum value. The monotonicity properties of
δ(·) are important: (i) if M∗ and ωi1 increase uniformly, then δ increases; (ii) if ψi1 increases
uniformly, then δ decreases.
Theorem 2. In the game of incomplete information, if each player i ∈ N becomes more
optimistic from µi to µ
′
i, then the largest and the smallest rationalizable strategy profiles
increase by at least δ(µ, µ′,u).
The theorem has several important implications.
The more optimistic players become, the larger the increase of the rationalizable strategy
profiles tends to be. This result is intuitive and holds across belief structures.
Interestingly, type-sensitivity is involved in locating the rationalizable strategy profiles
and its role is intuitive. If a player’s beliefs are not type-sensitive, then as he becomes more
optimistic, it takes a lot of negative information to convince him that his optimism was
unfounded. Thus, larger actions can be supported at much lower types and the rationalizable
outcomes change a lot. This is the next corollary.
Corollary 3. Everything else equal, if beliefs become less type-sensitive and more optimistic,
then the minimal amount by which the extremal rationalizable profiles must rise increases.
Lastly, state monotonicity is conducive to larger shifts in the rationalizable outcomes via
M∗. The role of strategic complementarities is ambiguous. On the one hand, when a player
16The definition is omitted because it is similar to C∗ but with a minimum instead of a maximum.
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becomes more optimistic, he foresees larger aggregate values and the strategic complemen-
tarities determine his reaction to it. On the other hand, when a player receives a bad news,
the effect of strong complementarities is reversed. Bad news become worse news.
5.4. Example. Izmalkov and Yildiz (2010) study the investment game of Section 2. Players
have a uniform common prior and types ti = θ + νi. But each i has his own beliefs
about (1, 2) given by Pri. They define optimism as Pri(j > i), the probability with
which a player believes his type is lower than his opponent’s. The aggregate distribution is
Gi(τi) = Probi(tj > sj|ti, θ), but in symmetric two-action games, the only relevant types ti
in equilibrium are equal to sj. Hence Gi(τi) = Pri(j > i) and ω
i
2(v) ≡ ωi2 = ∆Pri(j > i).
A player becomes more optimistic according to our definition iff he becomes more optimistic
in the sense of Izmalkov and Yildiz (2010). This notion is related to second-order beliefs. We
already know C∗(ti) = C∗(ti) = 1 and M∗(x, ti) = x for all ti. Given the uniform prior, the
marginal beliefs are highly type-sensitive, ψi1(v) = v. The marginal beliefs do not change,
ωi1 = 0. It follows from theorem 2 that
δ(µ, µ′,u) = sup{v : −v + ωi2(v) ≥ 0,∀ti, i} = ωi2 = min
i
∆Pri(j > i), (5.2)
which is conform to their finding. In their model, there is a unique rationalizable profile and
it co-varies perfectly with optimism, as shown by (5.2).
6. Applications
6.1. Supermodular Mechanism Design. Consider an adaptation of Mathevet (2010)’s
motivating example. A principal needs to decide the level of a public good x ∈ [0, 2].
There are two agents, 1 and 2, whose type spaces are T1 = T2 = [−.3, 1.3]. Types are
independently and uniformly distributed. Preferences are quasilinear, ui(x, ti) = Vi(x, ti)+mi
with V1(x, t1) = t1x− x2 and V2(x, t2) = t2x+ x22 . The principal wishes to make the efficient
decision x∗(t) = t1 + t2, because it maximizes the sum V1 + V2. She asks each agent to
report his type. Denote i’s reported type by ai. Given the reports a = (a1, a2), the principal
chooses public good level x∗(a) and money transfers mi(a). If the reports are truthful, the
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decision is efficient. Let ai ∈ A = {0, δ, 2δ, . . . , 1} where δ > 0.17 Mathevet (2010) suggests













− a22 + ρ2a2(a1 − 1/2)
where ρ1 and ρ2 have to be chosen. The utility functions Vi(x
∗(a), ti)+mi(a), i = 1, 2, define
a private value environment. There are values of ρ1 and ρ2, including resp. 2 and -1, for
which the assumptions of Section 3 are satisfied. In particular, the utility functions have




ai = 0 is strictly dominant for ti < t = −14 . By Theorem 1, this mechanism induces a game
whose size of the equilibrium set is less than
ε(µ,u) = inf{v > 0 : v > v ⇒ δv − σ12(v)(ρ1 − 2) > 0 and δv − σ22(v)(1 + ρ2) > 0}. (6.1)
Thus, the equilibrium set may enlarge as ρ1 and ρ2 increase, an observation at the heart of
optimal supermodular implementation (Mathevet (2010)). (6.1) also shows that the mech-
anism has a unique equilibrium for ρ1 = 2 and ρ2 = −1. For these values, the unique
equilibrium is essentially truthful: if his type falls in A a player reports truthfully, otherwise
he chooses the report closest to his type. Our conclusions hold for any δ > 0.
6.2. The Effect of Updating Biases. This section studies the strategic implications of
some updating biases. Our framework relies on posterior beliefs. Epstein (2006) axiomatizes
posterior beliefs that are the product of non-Bayesian updating. Although our framework
does not capture every kind of non-Bayesian settings, it applies to some situations axioma-
tized by Epstein (2006). We consider two of them: the prior and the overreaction bias.
Players have a common prior about θ with cdf P and they each receive a signal ti = θ+ i
of the realized state. Conditional on signal ti, player i has marginal beliefs µi(·|ti) that may
be different from the beliefs BUi(·|ti) that a Bayesian player would have.
17Reports are finite to satisfy our framework. Moreover, the largest and smallest types that an agent can
report are 0 and 1. This will imply some lying for extreme true types but it guarantees the existence of
dominance regions.
21
The beliefs formulated by the non-Bayesian players under P and the linear signaling
functions might be the same as the beliefs formulated by Bayesian players with some priors
{Pˆi} and other signaling functions. Therefore, we must be cautious when talking about
non-Bayesian updating. However, from an applied perspective, the analyst may believe that
players indeed make mistake when processing information, hence she may take the above
specification seriously. Besides, the analyst may be unwilling to recover the priors {Pˆi}, or
the signaling functions, that correspond to the same type space under Bayesian updating.
In effect, then, the players in her model are not Bayesian (see Epstein (2006)).
6.2.1. Prior Bias. A player who has a prior bias gives “too little” weight to observation.
Given Epstein (2006), this can be modeled as
µi(·|ti) = αP (·) + (1− α)BUi(·|ti), (6.2)
where α ∈ [0, 1] measures the magnitude of the bias. Since P gives no weight to the type,
it is clear BUi(·|ti) is more type-sensitive than µi. Therefore σi1(·) is smaller than that of a
Bayesian player. What about σi2(·)? Player i constructs the same aggregate distribution as
the Bayesian player, because ti plays no role in Gi conditionally on θ. Since σ
i
1(·) is smaller
than for a Bayesian player, so is σi2(·) by definition. By Corollary 1, the prior bbias tends to
favor multiplicity and wider sets of rationalizable strategy profiles.
6.2.2. Overreaction. A player who is subject to overreaction gives “too much” weight to
observation. Let θ∗ be the expected state under P . This bias can be modeled as
Qi(·|ti) = BUi(·|ti + α(ti − θ∗)), (6.3)
where α ∈ [0, 1] measures the magnitude of the bias. A biased player believes at ti what
a Bayesian player would believe at ti + α(ti − θ∗). Hence, after receiving ti > (<)θ∗, i
interprets his information as a better (worse) news than what it is. Assume BUi belongs to
a location-scale family. Because ti + αti − θ∗ = (1 + α)ti − αθ∗, overreaction leads to larger
type-sensitivity. The overreaction bias promotes tighter rationalizable sets.
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6.3. Type-sensitivity and Influence. This section investigates the relationship between
type-sensitivity and a notion of influence in games. Players whose beliefs are more type-
sensitive are more influential. This relationship is particularly interesting when type sen-
sitivity is viewed as confidence in one’s information. Behavioral economics provides many
definitions of confidence, some related to the perceived precision of one’s information (Odean
(1999), Healy and Moore (2009)). More confident players are more influential.
Consider binary-action games. Theorem 1 says that, unless type-sensitivity is high for all
players, there should be multiple equilibria. Assume there are many equilibria. Take any two
of them, s∗ and s∗∗, such that s∗ < s∗∗. One way of measuring the influence of a player is via
s∗∗i − s∗i . This is the amount by which a player changes his equilibrium strategy in response
to changes in others’ equilibrium strategies. For example, if s∗∗1 − s∗1 < maxj 6=1 s∗∗j − s∗j , then
any player j changes his strategy more than 1, although j responds to a smaller change in
his opponents’ strategies than 1.18 1 is said to be more influential.
Proposition 1. For any player i, any subset N ⊂ N\{i}, and any two equilibria s∗∗ and
s∗, there exist σ1(·) and σ2(·) such that σi1(v) ≥ σ1(v) and σi2(v) ≤ σ2(v) for all v > 0 imply
that i is more influential than any j ∈ N : s∗∗i − s∗i < maxj∈N s∗∗j − s∗j .
The proof uses arguments from the proof of Theorem 1 and is omitted.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced type-sensitivity and generalized optimism, two notions
that capture essential features of the beliefs involved in shaping the set of rationalizable
strategy profiles. The main advantage of the approach is twofold. First, it does not specify
the origin of the beliefs, and thus it covers new scenarios. Second, it synthesizes properties
of beliefs and payoffs into explicit expressions that give insightful comparative statics.
18Player 1’s opponents change their strategies more than j’s opponents because s∗∗−1− s∗−1 > s∗∗−j − s∗−j in
the product order.
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Appendix A. Aggregate Distribution
Consider the set of vectors of types that are lower than t′−i:
L(t′−i) = {t−i ∈ T−i : tj ≤ t′j for all j 6= i}.
Let ` = (`1, . . . , `i−1, `i+1, . . . , `N) ∈ NN−1 and denote by a−i,` the vector of actions such that
each j 6= i plays action aj,`j . Define A−i(γ, θ) = {` ∈ NN−1 : Γi(a−i,`, θ) = γ} to be the set
of combinations of actions that yield aggregate value γ at state θ. Recall that player j plays
action aj,`j if and only if his type is in [sj,`j−1, sj,`j ]. The aggregate distribution is described
by the following probability mass function








Let Gi(·|τi) be the cumulative distribution function obtained from gi.
Appendix B. Proofs
The argument of the first result goes as follows:
(1) The games under consideration have strategic complements (GSC). This implies the
existence of a largest and a smallest equilibrium (Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and
Vives (1990)).
(2) Furthermore, the payoffs display some monotonicity between actions and states, and
the beliefs display monotonicity in type. By Van Zandt and Vives (2007), (a) best-
responses to monotone (in-type) strategies are monotone and (b) the extremal equi-
libria are in monotone strategies.
(3) We prove that the best-reply mapping, restricted to monotone strategies, is a con-
traction for all pairs of profiles that are distant enough. Since the extremal equilibria
are in monotone strategies, they can be no further apart than this distance.
(4) Since extremal equilibria bound the set of profiles in rationalizable strategies in GSC,
this gives a distance between any pair of rationalizable profiles.
In view of (2), we restrict attention to monotone (in-type) strategies. Any such strategy
can be represented as a finite sequence of cutoff points. Call these cutoff points real cutoffs
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as opposed to the fictitious cutoffs defined later. Player i’s strategy is si = (si,`)
Mi−1
`=1 where
each si,` is the threshold type below which i plays a` and above which he plays a`+1.
Definition 6. For each i, the fictitious cutoff between an and am, denoted cn,m is defined, if
it exists, as the (only) type ti such that Eui(an, s−i, ti)− Eui(am, s−i, ti) = 0.
The notation ∆nmui(γ, θ) gives the difference in utility between an and am given aggregate
value γ and state θ. Define the expected utility as





ui(ai, γ, θ)gi(γ|θ, s−i, ti)dµi(θ|ti). (B.1)
Similarly, ∆nmEui(s−i, ti) = Eui(ai,n, s−i, ti)−Eui(ai,m, s−i, ti). We often write ∆ instead of
∆nm.
B.1. Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. If v > ε(µ,u), then for all pairs of actions (an, am), types ti, strategies s−i,
and i ∈ N such that
Eui(an, s−i, ti)− Eui(am, s−i, ti) ≥ 0 (B.2)
the following inequality holds
Eui(an, s−i + v, ti + v)− Eui(am, s−i + v, ti + v) > 0 (B.3)







∆ui(γ, θ)gi(γ|θ, s−i + v, ti + v)dµσ
i
1(v)
i (θ|ti) > 0 (B.4)
would imply (B.3), because
∑
∆ui(γ, θ)gi(γ|θ, s−i, ti + v) is increasing in θ. After a change




∆ui(γ, θ + σ
i
1(v))gi(γ|τi + c(v))
 > 0. (B.5)
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(∆ui(γ, θ + σ
i





∆ui(γ, θ)(gi(γ|τi + c(v))− gi(γ|τi))
 > 0 (B.6)
would imply (B.5). The first member of (B.6) is strictly positive, because ∆ui is strictly
increasing in θ. Although the second member is not always positive, it admits a lower bound
to be constructed next. For any γ ∈ Gi, define S(γ) = min{γ′ ∈ Gi : γ′ > γ} to be the
successor of γ. By convention, let Gi(S(γ)|·) = 1. Define
C∗(θ) = max
γ
∆ui(ai,Mi , ai,1, S(γ), θ)−∆ui(ai,Mi , ai,1, γ, θ)
S(γ)− γ (B.7)
to be the largest amount of complementarities in i’s payoffs. Let G∗i be the cdf of distribution
Gi(τi) ∨Gi(τi + c(v)) and let g∗i be its probability mass function. Note that
∑
γ≥γ
∆ui(γ, θ)(gi(γ|τi + c(v))− gi(γ|τi)) =
∑
γ≥γ
(Gi(S(γ)|τi + c(v))−Gi(S(γ)|τi))(∆ui(γ, θ)−∆ui(S(γ), θ)). (B.8)
Since ∆ui is increasing in γ, it follows from the definition of type-sensitivity that∑
γ≥γ(Gi(S(γ)|τi + c(v))−Gi(S(γ)|τi))(∆ui(γ, θ)−∆ui(S(γ), θ))
≥ ∑γ≥γ(Gi(S(γ)|τi + c(v))−G∗i (S(γ)|τi))(∆ui(γ, θ)−∆ui(S(γ), θ))
≥ ∑γ≥γ(Gi(S(γ)|τi + c(v))−G∗i (S(γ)|τi))(γ − S(γ))C∗(θ)
= C∗(θ)
∑
γ γ(gi(γ|τi + c(v))− g∗i (γ|τi))
≥ −C∗(θ)σi2(v)
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The last expression provides a lower bound on the second member of (B.6). Let us now
bound the first member of (B.6). For x ∈ R, let
M∗(θ, x) = min
(γ,n,m)
∆ui(an, am, γ, θ + x)−∆ui(an, am, γ, θ) (B.9)
be the smallest amount of complementarities between action and state. Note
∑
γ≥γ
(∆ui(γ, θ + σ
i




1(v))]− σi2(v)Eθ|ti [C∗(θ)] > 0 (B.10)
holds, then it implies (B.6). By definition of ε(µ,u), if v > ε(µ,u), then (B.10) holds for all
pairs of actions an and am, types ti, strategies s−i, and i ∈ N . Therefore (B.6) holds, hence
(B.5) and (B.3) are satisfied for all these parameters. 
B.2. Real vs. Fictitious Cutoffs and Proposition 4. The real cutoffs are the thresh-
old types that separate an action from its successor. They are sufficient to represent any
increasing strategy. How to recover the real cutoffs from the fictitious cutoffs?
Example 1. Consider a game with two players. Let A1 = A2 = {0, 1, 2}. There are three
fictitious cutoffs, c1,0, c2,0 and c2,1, but only two are needed to represent a player’s best-
response. Which ones? For instance, suppose strategy (0.2, 0.8) is a best-response for i to
some strategy sj of player j. It consists in playing 0 for types below 0.2, 2 for types above 0.8,
and 1 in between. In this case, the first real cutoff, si,1, that separates 0 and 1 is 0.2 = c1,0.
The second real cutoff, si,2, that separates 1 and 2 is 0.8 = c2,1. Now, consider the following
best-response (0.4, 0.4) to s′j. In this case, the player never plays 1 except possibly on a set
of measure zero (when receiving exactly type 0.4). The first real cutoff, s′i,1, that separates 0
and 1 is 0.4 = c′2,0, but the second real cutoff, s
′
i,2, is also c
′
2,0, because 1 is not played. This
shows that a real cutoff is not always the same fictitious cutoff. It can take on the value of
different fictitious cutoffs.
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This leads to the following definition where the real cutoffs are defined recursively from
the fictitious cutoffs.19
Definition 7. The largest real cutoff, si,Mi−1, is the fictitious cutoff cMi,α such that (i)
for any ti > cMi,α, ∆
Mi
k Eui(s−i, ti) > 0 for all k 6= Mi, (ii) for some  > 0 and any
ti ∈ (cMi,α − , cMi,α), ∆αkEui(s−i, ti) > 0 for all k 6= α. Suppose si,` = cn,m. Then define
si,`−1 as follows. If ` > m, then the real cutoff si,`−1 = cn,m. If ` = m, then si,`−1 = cm,β
such that (i) for any ti > cm,β, ∆
m
k Eui(s−i, ti) > 0 for all k 6= m and (ii) for some  > 0
and any ti ∈ (cmi,β − , cmi,β), ∆βkEui(s−i, ti) > 0 for all k 6= β.
The dominance regions imply that ai,Mi will be played, so the largest real cutoff is the
fictitious cutoff between ai,Mi and the action ai,α played before it. All actions in between are
not played, hence they receive the same real cutoff. We proceed in a downward fashion to
find the action that was played before ai,α and so on.
The next proposition shows that if an action is strictly dominated by another action for
all types against some opposing profile, then it must be strictly dominated by that same
action for all types and against all opposing profiles. As a result, the same set of fictitious
cutoffs will exist across opposing strategy profiles.





−i, ti) > Eui(ai, s
′
−i, ti) for all ti ∈ R, then Eui(a′i, s−i, ti) > Eui(ai, s−i, ti)
for all s−i and ti ∈ R.





−i, ti) > Eui(ai, s
′





−i + v, ti + v)− Eui(ai, s′−i + v, ti + v) > 0, (B.11)
for all v > ε(µ,u) and ti. For any s−i, choose v > ε(µ,u) such that s′−i+v ≥ s−i (so s−i is a
larger strategy). Larger strategies lead to larger aggregates, hence (B.11) and the strategic
19Existence of the fictitious cutoffs poses no problem in the definition, for if a real cutoff takes on the
value of a fictitious cutoff, that fictitious cutoff must exist.
20If ε(µ,u) = θ−θ+2Di, then the main result says that the size of the equilibrium set is the whole space.





i, s−i, ti + v)− Eui(ai, s−i, ti + v) > 0
for all ti. This is equivalent to Eui(a
′
i, s−i, ti) − Eui(ai, s−i, ti) > 0 for all ti. Since s−i







−i, ti) > Eui(ai, s
′





−i − v, ti − v)− Eui(ai, s′−i − v, ti − v) > 0 (B.12)
for all v > ε(µ,u) and ti. For any s−i, choose v > ε(µ,u) such that s−i ≥ s′−i−v. By (B.12)
and the strategic complementarities, we have
Eui(a
′
i, s−i, ti − v)− Eui(ai, s−i, ti − v) > 0
for all ti, which is equivalent to Eui(a
′
i, s−i, ti)− Eui(ai, s−i, ti) > 0 for all ti. 
The next proposition is an important piece of the main theorem. If all of i’s fictitious
cutoffs contract in response to a variation of s−i, then so do all of i’s real cutoffs. That is,
i’s best-reponse contracts as well.
Proposition 4. Suppose ε(µ,u) < θ − θ + 2 maxiDi. If, for some v > 0, we have |c′n,m −
cn,m| < v for all n and m for which c′n,m and cn,m exist, then |si,` − s′i,`| < v for all ` =
1, . . . ,Mi − 1.
Proof. The result is proved by induction. Suppose that, for some v > 0, |c′n,m− cn,m| < v for
all n and m for which both c′n,m and cn,m exist.
We first prove that the result holds for the largest real cutoff and then extend it to other




The largest action ai,Mi is always played for large enough types. So the largest real
cutoff always takes on the value of the fictitious cutoff between ai,Mi and some other action.





. Proposition 3 implies that cMi,z must
exist. To see why, suppose cMi,z did not exist. Since aMi must be played, it would mean that
aMi strictly dominates az for all ti against s−i. Proposition 3 would then imply that aMi
strictly dominates az for all ti and all opposing strategies, s
′
−i in particular, contradicting the
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existence of c′Mi,z. Therefore, s
′
i,Mi−1 − si,Mi−1 = c′Mi,z − cMi,w = c′Mi,z − cMi,z + cMi,z − cMi,w.
Note that cMi,z − cMi,w ≤ 0. Indeed, si,Mi−1 = cMi,w implies that ai,Mi is played right
after ai,w in the best-response, hence ai,Mi became preferable to ai,z before cMi,w. Since
c′Mi,z − cMi,z < v, then s′i,Mi−1 − si,Mi−1 < v. The proof is similar for si,Mi−1 − s′i,Mi−1, hence
|s′i,Mi−1 − si,Mi−1| < v.
For the other real cutoffs, the situation is more difficult, because the corresponding action
may not be played. By induction hypothesis, suppose that |s′i,`+1−si,`+1| < v. The objective
is to show that it implies |s′i,` − si,`| < v. There are several cases:
Case 1: Action ai,` is played both under si and s
′
i. This case is similar to the case of the
largest real cutoff, and the proof is identical.
Case 2: Action ai,` is played neither under si nor s
′
i. By definition (7), si,` = si,`+1 and
s′i,` = s
′
i,`+1. By induction hypothesis, |s′i,` − si,`| = |s′i,`+1 − si,`+1| < v.
Case 3: Action ai,` is not played in si but it is in s
′
i. Then, si,` = cw,z for some actions




`,x for some ai,x. Write s
′
i,` − si,` = c′`,x − cw,z.
First, we establish that both cw,` and c
′
w,` exist. Action ai,w is played (under si) against
s−i but it cannot strictly dominate ai,` for all types ti, because if it did, then Proposition
3 would imply that it is also the case (under s′i) against s
′
−i (thus ai,` could not be played
under s′i, yet it is). Therefore, cw,` must exist. This implies that for all ti ≥ cw,`,
Eui(ai,w, s−i, ti) > Eui(ai,`, s−i, ti). (B.13)
Let h = (h, . . . , h) where h > ε(µ,u) is large enough such that s−i + h ≥ s′−i. It follows
from Proposition 2 and (B.13) that for all ti ≥ cw,`,
Eui(ai,w, s−i + h, ti + h) > Eui(ai,`, s−i + h, ti + h)
and thus by strategic complementarities,
Eui(ai,w, s
′
−i, ti + h) > Eui(ai,`, s
′
−i, ti + h),
for all ti ≥ cw,`. We know ai,` is played (under s′i) against s′−i, so the last inequality implies
that c′w,` exists.
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Second, we prove that real cutoff contracts. The following inequality must hold, c′w,` ≥ c′`,x,
because ai,` is played under s
′
i in an open set of types above c
′
`,x (so it is only for types larger
than c′`,x that ai,w can be preferred to ai,`). Similarly, cw,` ≤ cw,z, because ai,w is played under
si in an open set of types above cw,z, hence ai,w started to be preferred to ai,` for smaller
types. As a result,
s′i,` − si,` = c′`,x − cw,z ≤ c′w,` − cw,`,
so s′i,`− si,` < v. By a similar reasoning, si,`− s′i,` ≤ c′`,z − c`,z, and so si,`− s′i,` < v. Putting
everything together, |s′i,` − si,`| < v.
Case 4: Action a` is played in si but it is not in s
′
i. The argument is similar to case 3. 
B.3. Proof of Theorem 1. The theorem relies on the concept of a q-contraction.
Definition 8. Let (X, d) be a metric space. If ξ : X → X satisfies the condition d(ξ(x), ξ(y)) <
d(x, y) for all x, y ∈ X such that d(x, y) > q, then ξ is called a q-contraction.
A traditional contraction mapping “shrinks” the image of all points. A q-contraction only
“shrinks” the image of points that are sufficiently far apart (further apart than q). Naturally,
a q-contraction cannot have fixed points that are too far apart.
Proof of Theorem 1. Recall that i’s expected utility of playing ai when his type is ti and the
other players play s−i is given by (B.1). Now pick n,m ∈ {1, . . . ,Mi} such that n > m. If
it exists, the fictitious cutoff between ai,n and ai,m is defined as the type ti such that





∆ui(γ, θ)gi(γ|θ, s−i, cn,m)dµi(θ|cn,m) = 0. (B.14)
By state monotonicity, ∆ui is strictly increasing in θ and increasing in γ. Since µi is strictly
increasing in ti w.r.t. first-order stochastic dominance, and since Gi is increasing in (θ, ti)
w.r.t. to first-order stochastic dominance, there can be only one type ti that satisfies (B.14).
As a result, the best-replies (which are cutoff strategies) are almost everywhere functions, and
not correspondences. Consider two profiles of strategies for players −i, s−i = (sj,`) and s′−i =
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(s′j,`). Denote vj,` = |s′j,` − sj,`| for ` = 1, . . . ,Mj − 1. Let v = maxj 6=i max`∈{1,...,Mj−1} vj,`.
Player i’s cutoff between ai,n and ai,m against s−i, denoted cn,m, satisfies (B.14). The cutoff




n,m. By way of contradiction, assume c
′





∆ui(γ, θ)gi(γ|θ, s′−i, cn,m + v)dµi(θ|cn,m + v) = 0. (B.15)
If v > ε(µ,u), Proposition 2 says that (B.14) and (B.15) cannot hold simultaneously. That
is, c′n,m = cn,m + v cannot be the cutoff against s
′
−i if cn,m is the cutoff against s−i. Clearly,
this claim holds for c′n,m ≥ cn,m + v. Therefore, c′n,m − cn,m < v. If c′n,m is the cutoff against
s′−i, the same argument shows that whenever cn,m is larger than c
′
n,m + v, both cannot
cutoffs. In conclusion, if v > ε(µ,u), then for all players, |c′n,m − cn,m| < v for all n,m
such that both cutoffs exist. Proposition 4 implies that each i’s best-reply is an ε(µ,u)-
contraction. From Milgrom and Roberts (1990), it follows that there exist two extremal
equilibria, s and s, that correspond to the extremal profiles of rationalizable strategies. We
abuse notation and use d as the sup-norm on different metric spaces. Let e = (1, 1, . . . , 1)
be the vector of ones. Since bri is an ε(µ,u)-contraction, if d(s, s) > ε(µ,u), then we have
d(bri(s−i − d(s, s)e), bri(s−i)) < d(s, s). Thus,
d(s, s) = d(br(s), br(s))
= maxi∈N d(bri(s−i), bri(s−i))
≤ maxi∈N d(bri(s−i − d(s, s)e), bri(s−i)))
< d(s, s),
where the first inequality holds because best-replies are increasing.21 This string of inequal-
ities leads to a contradiction, and thus d(s, s) ≤ ε(µ,u). 
B.4. Theorem 2. We first state a proposition that will be used in the proof.
Proposition 5. Let {cn,m} be the set of fictitious cutoffs under µ, and let {cn,m} be the set
of fictitious cutoffs under µ′, where µ′i is more optimistic than µi for each i. If, for some
21Notice s−i − d(s, s) is a larger strategy than s−i.
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v > 0, cn,m−c′n,m ≥ v for all n and m such that both fictitious cutoffs exist, then si,`−s′i,` ≥ v
for all ` = 1, . . . ,Mi − 1.
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 4, hence it is omitted.
Proof of Theorem 2. In supermodular games, the largest (smallest) equilibrium coincide with
the largest (smallest) profile of rationalizable strategies. Consider the largest (smallest)
equilibrium, denoted by s (s), under beliefs µi, i = 1, . . . , n. Against s−i, i’s fictitious cutoff




∆ui(γ, θ)gi(γ|θ, s−i, cn,m)dµi(θ|cn,m) = 0. (B.16)






i(γ|θ, s−i, cn,m)dµ′i(θ|cn,m)dθ ≥ 0, (B.17)
because ∆ui is increasing in θ and γ. Thus, the fictitious cutoff between an and am must be




∆ui(γ, θ)gi(γ|θ, s−i, ti)dµi(θ|ti) = 0 (B.18)






i(γ|θ, s−i, ti − v)dµ′i(θ|ti − v)dθ > 0, (B.19)
then ti − v cannot be the fictitious cutoff under µ′i, because ti − v is too large. This means






i(γ|θ, s−i, ti − v)dµi(θ − ω1 + ψi1(v)|ti) > 0 (B.20)




∆ui(γ, θ + ω1 − ψi1(v))g′i(γ|θ + ω1 − ψi1(v), s−i, ti − v)dµi(θ|ti) > 0. (B.21)
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i(γ|θ + ω1 − ψi1(v), s−i, ti − v)− gi(γ|θ, s−i, ti))dµi(θ|ti) > 0. (B.22)
For each of the two expressions forming (B.22), we find a lower bound. Consider the first





(∆ui(γ, θ + ω1 − ψi1(v))−∆ui(γ, θ))g′i(γ|θ + ω1 − ψi1(v), s−i, ti − v)dµi(θ|ti) ≥∫
R
M∗(ω1 − ψi1(v), ti)dµi(θ|ti) (B.23)





i(γ|θ + ω1 − ψi1(v), s−i, ti − v)− gi(γ|θ, s−i, ti)) =
∑
γ≥γ
(G′i(S(γ)|θ + ω1 − ψi1(v), s−i, ti − v)−Gi(S(γ)|θ, s−i, ti))(∆ui(γ, θ)−∆ui(S(γ), θ))
(B.24)
Let G∗i (τi) be the cdf of distribution Gi(τi)∨G′i(τi− o(v)). Let G∗,i(τi) be the cdf of Gi(τi)∧
G′i(τi − o(v)). Use the same notation for the probability mass functions. Define
C∗(θ) = min
(γ,n,m)
∆ui(an, am, S(γ), θ)−∆ui(an, am, γ, θ)
S(γ)− γ (B.25)
to be the minimal amount of strategic complementarities at state θ (recall n > m). Suppose
first that G′i(τi − o(v)) ≥st Gi(τi) for all τi. Then wi2(v) ≤ Γei [G′i(τi − o(v))] − Γei [Gi(τi)] for
34
all τi. Since ∆ui is increasing in γ, the definition optimism gives∑
γ≥γ(G
′





i(S(γ)|τi − o(v))−G∗,i(S(γ)|τi))(∆ui(γ, θ)−∆ui(S(γ), θ))





i(γ|τi − o(v))− g∗,i(γ|τi))
≥ C∗(θ)wi2(v)
Suppose now that G′i(τi − o(v)) 6≥st Gi(τi) for some τi. Then wi2(v) ≤ Γei [G′i(τi − o(v))] −
Γei [G
′
i(τi − o(v)) ∨Gi(τi)] for all τi. For all τi,∑
γ≥γ(G
′
i(S(γ)|τi − o(v))−Gi(S(γ)|τi))(∆ui(γ, θ)−∆ui(S(γ), θ))
≥ ∑γ≥γ(G′i(S(γ)|τi − o(v))−G∗i (S(γ)|τi))(∆ui(γ, θ)−∆ui(S(γ), θ))





i(γ|τi − o(v))− g∗i (γ|τi))
≥ C∗(θ)wi2(v)
Putting this together with (B.23), if (B.16) holds, then∫
R











implies (B.19). Let M∗(ω1 − ψi1(v), ti) = Eθ|ti [M∗(θ, ω1 − ψi1(v))], C∗(ti) = Eθ|ti [C∗(θ)] and
C∗(ti) = Eθ|ti [C∗(θ)]. Let us summarize. Assume that beliefs become more optimistic from
µ to µ′. Since the real cutoffs associated with some extremal equilibrium under µ satisfy
(B.18) (see e.g. (B.16)), the transition to µ′ must lead each of them to increase by at least
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δ(µ, µ′,u), for otherwise a smaller increase would imply (B.19), a contradiction of optimality.
Formally, δ(µ, µ′,u) gives the infimum value of v such that (B.26) is satisfied for all pair of
actions, strategies of players −i, and player i. This means that cn,m − c′n,m ≥ δ(µ, µ′,u) for
all n and m. Proposition 5 completes the proof. 
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